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PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS: THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES~RTHEDOHA 
CONFERENCE 
L. DANIELLE TULLY* 
Abstract: Intellectual property rights (IPRs) have long been the subject 
of contentious debate between developed and developing countries. 
While providing an incentive to invest in and develop new technologies, 
IPRs also vastly increase the cost of these new technologies to 
developing countries. Despite disagreement on the proper role for IPRs 
in the global economy, IPRs became a major element in the 1994 
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which established the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Effective on January 1, 1995, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Agreement (TRIPS Agreement) formally linked compliance 
with minimum protection standards with international trade. This 
linkage directly affects technology flows to, and the course of 
development in, developing countries. While the Fourth Ministerial 
Conference at Doha, Qatar on November 9-13, 2001 integrated the 
concerns of developing countries more fully than previous Ministerial 
Conferences, the issue of technology acquisition and development in 
light of the increasing technology gap between developed and 
developing countries was overlooked. 
INTRODUCTION 
While globalization is breaking down barriers to trade and com-
munication, it is also creating new forms of exclusion as the technol-
ogy gap widens between rich and poor countries} With the exception 
of the relatively recent emergence of a few East Asian countries and 
newly industrialized countries (NICs), developed countries retain 
economic power while developing countries and especially least de-
* L. Danielle Tully is the Solicitations and Symposium Editor of the Boston College In-
ternational & Comparative Law Review. 
1 See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 2001, at 46-63 (2001) 
[hereinafter DEVELOPMENT REPORT). 
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veloped countries (LDCs) 2 continue to face economic marginaliza-
tion.3 In order to increase capacity and foster both human develop-
ment and economic growth, developing countries must be encour-
aged to foster innovation, enhance entrepreneurialism, and advance 
the acquisition of technical skills.4 Utilizing technology as a tool for 
development, however, has become complicated.5 Under the global 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) regime based primarily on the 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 
(TRIPS Agreement), member states of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) must adhere to specified minimum standards of IPRs protec-
tion.6 The implementation and enforcement of these minimum stan-
dards, especially in the area of patents, directly affects transborder 
technology flows, and, as a result, the course of progress for develop-
ing countries.7 
Even before signing the TRIPS Agreement, IPRs existed "at the 
heart of a highly polarized debate on technology and development. "8 
IPRs provide incentives to invest in research and to develop new 
technologies because they allow investors to reap returns on their in-
2 For the WfO's approach to the definitions of "developing" countries and "LDCs" see 
http:/ /www.wto.org/ english/tratop_e/ devel_e/ d1who_e.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2002). 
3 See Evelyn Su, The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
kctual Property Rights and Its Effects on Developing Countries, 23 Hous. J. INT'L L. 169, 195-97 
(2000). 
4 See PENNY FOWLER, HARNESSING ThAnE FOR DEVELOPMENT 35-36 (Qxfam Interna-
tional 2001), at http:/ /www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/trade/trade.pdf; PES GROUP, A 
NEW DIRECTION IN WORLD ThADE: TOWARDS A WfQ ROUND FOR DEVELOPMENT, DEMOC-
RACY AND SUSTAINABILITY 11-12 (Apr. 2001), at http:/ /www.ictsd.org/ministerial/doha/ 
WfO-shortpaper-ENfinal.PDF; see also DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 1, at 95-117 (dis-
cussing technology as a tool for development). 
5 See PES Group, supra note 4, at 11-12; Carlos A. Primo Braga, Trade-Related Intelkctual 
Property Issues: The Uruguay Round Agreement and Its Economic Implications, 45 (Jan. 1995) 
(paper presented at The Uruguay Round and the Developing Economie5-A World Bank Con-
ference); J .H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global competition Under the TRIPS 
Agreemertt, 29 N.YU.J. INT'L L. & PoL. 11, 22-23 (1996-1997). 
6 See Braga, supra note 5, at 12; Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization(Apr. 15, 1994), Annex 1C, availabk at http:/ /www.wto.org/english/docs_e/ 
legal_e/04-wto.pdf. (hereinafter WfQ Agreement]; LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF 
THE URUGUAY RouND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], avail-
abk at http:/ /www.wto.org/ english/tratop_e/tTips_e/t_agmO_e.htm. 
7 See Ruth L. Gana, Prospects for Developing Countries Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 VAND. 
j. ThANSNAT'L L. 735, 743 (1996). 
8 DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 02; see also Keith E. Mask us, Intelkctual Prop-
erty Chalknges for Developing Countries: An Economic Perspective, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 457, 458 
(2001) 0 
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vestments by providing temporary monopoly rights.9 However, the 
current regime dominated by the TRIPS Agreement does not strike 
the appropriate balance between creating private incentives and fos-
tering technology transfers and development for the public benefit.l0 
Critical, yet insufficient, progress was made at the WfO's Fourth Min-
isterial Conference in Doha, Qatar from November 9-13, 2001 on 
pressing issues faced by developing countries as they try to strike a 
new balance between these private incentives and public benefits.11 
This Note will analyze the challenges faced by developing coun-
tries in light of the TRIPS Agreement. Part I describes the historical 
foundations of IPRs and the process by which they became intimately 
linked with global trade. Part II discusses divergent viewpoints on IPRs 
and considers the TRIPS Agreement's impact on developing coun-
tries. Part III analyzes relevant aspects of the Fourth Ministerial Con-
ference of the wro, and considers the prospects for developing 
countries with regard to accessing and developing technologies after 
Doha. This Note concludes by advocating for further investigation of 
the link between technology acquisition and creation, the TRIPS 
Agreement, and developing countries. 
I. REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
A. From Paris to W/'0-Multilateral Treaties Emerge in Response to Desires 
for Increased Rights Protection Globally 
Historically, IPRs law resided primarily within the domestic 
sphere.12 The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Prop-
erty ("Paris Convention"), signed in 1883, and the Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works ("Berne Conven-
tion"), signed in 1886, are two of the oldest agreements on the inter-
national protection of IPRs.l3 While both conventions provided for 
9 DEVELOPMENT REPORT, S!tpra note 1, at 102. 
1o Id. 
11 See Ministerial Conference, Ministerial Declamtion, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 
2001), at http:/ /docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp [hereinafter Ministerial Declarationl; 
Ministerial Conference, Declamtion on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Wf /MIN (01) I 
DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001), at http:/ /docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp. [hereinafter Public 
Health Declaration] 
12 See Su, supm note 3, at 173. 
15 See Su, supm note 3, at 178-81; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, Mar. 20, 1883, at http:/ /www.wipo.int/treaties/documents/english/pdf/d-
paris.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2002); Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
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equal treatment of foreign and domestic claimants under interna-
tional intellectual property law, they differed greatly on standards and 
remedies.14 The Paris Convention, which protects against trademark 
and patent infringement, did not set forth any substantive standards 
for patent protection to which members must adhere.15 Conversely, 
the Berne Convention, which protects against copyright infringe-
ment, established minimum standards of protection but "fail[ed] to 
outline clear legal remedies by which copyright holders may enforce 
their rights against infringers. "16 
Established in 1967, the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), a specialized agency of the United Nations, now administers 
the Paris and Berne Conventions along with other intellectual prop-
erty treatiesP Similar to the Paris Convention, later WIPO treaties 
and treaty revisions did not establish minimum protection standards.18 
Plagued by weak enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms, 
WIPO provided little in the way of coordination during the 1970s and 
early 1980s.19 As a result, "[d]espite WIPO efforts to promote interna-
tional comity with respect to IPR protection, the level of harmoniza-
tion across countries achieved by the mid-1980s remained limited. "20 
During this same time, industrialized countries began to articulate an 
"intellectual property problem," namely the "unintended transfer of 
wealth from the industrialized country economies to the developing 
and newly industrialized country (NIC) economies. "21 
During the 1980s, rapid increases in international trade and the 
drastic shift to high-technology products led businesses, and particu-
larly multinational corporations, to voice concerns about piracy and 
lax intellectual property protections.22 A number of developing coun-
tries, including Brazil and India, either offered limited patent protec-
Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, at http:/ /www.wipo.int/treaties/documents/english/pdf/e-
berne.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2002). 
H See Su, supra note 3, at 178-81. 
15 Id. at 179-80. 
16 Id. at 181. 
17 Id. at 182. 
18 See Braga, supra note 5, at 3. 
19 See Marney L. Cheek, The Limits of Informal Rep;ulatory Cooperation in International Af 
fairs: A Review of the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 277, 290 
(2001 ); Su, supra note 3, at 183-84. 
20 Braga, supra note 5, at 3. 
21 Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property 
Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND.J. ThANSNAT'L L. 689, 697 (1989); 
see also Cheek, supm note 19, at 284-85. 
22 See Cheek, supra note 19, at 286. 
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tion for chemicals and pharmaceuticals or had compulsory licensing 
schemes for certain technologies, or utilized both practices. 23 In addi-
tion, industrialized countries viewed tolerance toward piracy in devel-
oping countries as a barrier to exports.24 Differential treatment, com-
bined with substantial research and development costs inherent in 
high-tech knowledge production, compelled companies to push for 
strong minimum standards for international protection of IPRs. 25 
In 1988, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) re-
quested that the United States International Trade Commission (lTC) 
attempt to quantifY financial losses to the United States' worldwide 
trade as a result of unintended or unauthorized appropriation of in-
tellectual property by developing country enterprises.26 The lTC sent 
a questionnaire to 736 U.S. companies. 27 Based on responses to this 
questionnaire, the Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
and the Effect on U.S. Industry and Trade Report (lTC Report) esti-
mated that in 1986, U.S. industries faced worldwide trade losses rang-
ing from $43 billion to $61 billion and that key U.S. industries lost 
$23.8 billion in revenue due to lack of IPRs enforcement in foreign 
countries.28 The lTC Report attributed significant losses to particular 
developing countries and NICs-namely Brazil, India, Mexico, Nige-
ria, the Republic of Korea, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.29 In addi-
tion, "[t]he industries that appear[ed] most affected [were] chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals, computer software, and entertainment (audio 
and video). "30 
Seeking to establish minimum standards and an effective interna-
tional mechanism for enforcement, the United States and other de-
veloped countries increased global pressure to include IPRs in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).31 For those seeking 
23 See Abbott, supra note 21, at 743 (summarizing Foreign Trade Barriers Report). 
24 Marco C.EJ. Bronckers, The Impact of TRIPS: Intellectual Property Protection in Develop-
ing Countries, 31 CoMMON MKT. L. REv. 1245, 1247 (1994). 
25 Su, supra note 3, at 173-4; see also Abbott, supra note 21, at 697 (discussing how intel-
lectual property is easily appropriated once it has been produced and that it has marginal 
reproduction costs). 
26 See Abbott, supra note 21, at 699-700. 
27 /d. at 700. 
28 Id.; Cheek, supra note 19, at 287; U.S. Int'l Trade Commission, Pub. No. 2065, For-
eign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and the Effect on U.S. Industry and Trade 
(1988) 
29 Abbott, supra note 21, at 701. 
30 !d. at 701-02. 
31 See id. at 695-96; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
ll, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
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a stronger international mechanism,"[t]he GAIT had several advan-
tages over WIPO. Most significantly, in contrast to the voluntary acces-
sion of countries to the various WIPO conventions, an agreement 
within the GAIT would commit all signatories to minimum stan-
dards. "!12 Strong opposition to the inclusion of intellectual property 
rights in the GAIT by developing countries-India and Brazil in par-
ticular-illustrated an emerging North-South debate about the pro-
priety of linking intellectual property rights to the free-trade agenda.33 
B. Establishing the WTO and the TRIPS Agreement 
The Uruguay Round of the GAIT ended in April 1994 with the 
signing of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organization, which outlines the rules for governing all of the Uru-
guay Accords.34 Following years of lobbying by the United States and 
the European Community, intellectual property rights emerged as a 
prominent element in these negotiations.35 Effective on January 1, 
1995, the TRIPS Agreement formally linked intellectual property with 
international trade.36 The TRIPS Agreement "obligates WfO-member 
countries to (1) provide minimum intellectual property rights protec-
tion through domestic laws; (2) provide effective enforcement of 
those rights; and (3) agree to submit disputes to the wro dispute 
settlement system. "37 These substantive provisions, however, remain 
subject to the objectives and principles of the TRIPS Agreement as 
defined in Articles 7 and 8 respectively. 38 
The spirit, if not the letter, of the TRIPS Agreement relies on the 
argument that increased technological capacity fosters development.ll9 
To this end, the TRIPS Agreement codified the rights and obligations 
of members in light of a desired balance between the protection of 
private IPRs on the one hand and socio-economic and technological 
development on the other.40 With regard to the objectives of the 
TRIPS Agreement, Article 7 specifically states that "[t]he protection 
and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to 
32 Cheek, supra note 19, at 288. 
33 See Abbott, supra note 21, at 718. 
34 wro Agreement, supra note 6. 
35 See Braga, supra note 5, at 12. 
86 See Bronckers, supra note 24, at 1249-50; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at part Ill. 
37 Cheek, supra note 19, at 292. 
38 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at arts. 7-8. 
39 See id. 
40 Id. 
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the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology ... and in a manner conducive to social 
and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. "41 
The principles in Article 8 build on the Article 7 objectives by ac-
knowledging that member countries may adopt measures to promote 
the public interest in sectors that are vital to their individual socio-
economic and technological development.42 
Despite the language in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
the provisions for "Patentable Subject Matter" outlined in Articles 27 
through 34 seem to establish standards for IPRs protection that can 
hardly be deemed minimal.43 Under the TRIPS Agreement, patents, 
for example, are available for inventions of both products and proc-
esses so long as they are "new, involve an inventive step and are capa-
ble of industrial application. "44 This precludes countries from estab-
lishing regimes that only provide protection to products or processes 
in order to foster innovation.45 In addition, "Article 33 requires that 
patent protection be afforded for twenty years from the date of filing, 
preventing countries from tinkering with the length of patents in or-
der to calibrate the longitudinal strength of the monopoly they con-
fer. "46 Article 28, regarding the rights conferred by patents on their 
owner, in conjunction with Article 31, regarding other use without 
authorization of the right holder, limit the extent to which countries 
can engage in compulsory licensing of either a product or a process 
without the prior consent of the patent holder.47 
41 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 7. 
42 !d. art. 8. 
43 See id. at arts. 27-34. 
44 TRIPS Agreement art. 27(1). 
45 Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: the Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmo-
nize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to 
Third World Countries, 17 U. PA.J. INT'L EcoN. L. 1069, 1098 (1996). 
46 !d.; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 33. 
47 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at arts. 28, 31. 
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II. THE 1RIPS AGREEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
A. Divergent Viewpoints on IPRs 
1. Views from the Developing World 
Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, developing countries had little 
incentive to create highly protective IPRs regimes.48 Rather, they fo-
cused on encouraging the free-flow of information and on acquiring a 
technological base from which to grow.49 "Low standards of patent 
protection in countries such as India and Brazil, for example, facili-
tated the development of industries, particularly in the pharmaceuti-
cal field. "5° In addition, little global consensus existed on what consti-
tuted patentable subject matter or the rights that a patent should 
confer. 51 
Opponents of creating strong IPRs protection in developing 
countries have argued that developing countries need maximum ac-
cess to Western technology to increase development. 52 This argument 
suggests that "[t]echnological information should be provided with 
minimal restriction because Third World development is in the inter-
est of all nations. "53 Other opponents of strong IPRs protection have 
also pointed out that most developed countries formerly enjoyed un-
precedented freedom to exploit intellectual property for their own 
economic development during the 18th and 19th centuries.54 They also 
argued that stronger IPRs protection would hamper economic devel-
opment by forcing developing countries to pay for the use of intellec-
tual property, which is held predominantly by individuals and corpo-
rations in developed countries. 55 
2. Views from the Developed World 
Headed by the United States, industrialized countries which rely 
heavily on information and the transfer of technology as major as-
48 Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global Economy, 
27 GEO. WAsn.J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 327, 330 (1993-1994). 
49 SeeGana, supra note 7, at 746--47. 
50 Id. at 746. 
51 I d. at 764; Giunta & Shang, supra note 48, at 329-30. 
52 See Giunta & Shang, supra note 48, at 330-31. 
53 Id. at 331. 
54 Ha:Joon Chang, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development: Historical Lessons 
and Emerging Issues, 2]. HuM. DEv. 287, 288-93 (2001). 
55 Bronckers, supra note 24, at 1247; DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 1, at 39. 
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pects of their economies argued loudly for the economic benefits of 
tight IPRs protection in opposition to demands by developing coun-
tries.56 With regard to protecting their own economies, developed 
countries argued that organized piracy undermined the incentive 
structure that trademark, patent, and copyright laws were designed to 
promote. 57 Defenders of strong global IPRs protection further argued 
that developing countries would benefit from increased innovative 
activities domestically and from greater availability of advanced tech-
nologies from abroad. 58 These benefits to developing countries would 
stem from an increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) and tech-
nology transfer as a direct result of stronger IPRs protection. 59 
B. The TRIPS Agreement's Impact on Developing Countries 
The effects of the TRIPS Agreement on developing countries 
vary in part with the degree to which these countries had established 
a domestic system of IPRs protection prior to becoming WTO mem-
bers. 50 For example, many developing countries such as Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Singapore, and Guatemala were parties to neither the Paris 
nor the Berne Convention prior to becoming WTO members. 61 Oth-
ers, like India, Bangladesh, and Uganda had ratified either the Paris 
or the Berne Convention but not both.62 Therefore, by becoming par-
ties to the WTO, many of these developing countries committed 
themselves to extreme levels of domestic reform. 63 To address this is-
sue, developing countries made various concessions to facilitate the 
transition from weak or non-existent IPRs protection to domestic sys-
tems that would meet the minimum standards established by the 
56 Giunta & Shang, supra note 48, at 332. 
57 !d. 
ss Chang, supra note 54, at 300--01. 
59 /d. at 301. 
60 See generally Giunta & Shang, supra note 48, at 346-58 (discussing the levels of IPR 
protection available in Japan, China, and India); Christopher S. Mayer, The Brazilian Phar-
maceutical Industry Goes Walking from !panema to Prosperity: Will the New Intellectual Property 
Law Spur Domestic Investmentr, 12 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. LJ. 377, 378-80 & 387-89 (1998) 
(discussing Brazilian patent law). 
61 Compiled from data listed in the Annex to Braga, supra note 5, at A9-All, (listing 
Membership in GAIT and in Major WIPO conventions as of April 5, 1994), and from 
WfO Members and Observers, at http:/ /www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/ 
org6_e.htm (containing the date of membership for each member)(last visited Nov. 12, 
2002). 
62 /d. 
68 See Cheek, supra note 19, at 294-95. 
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TRIPS Agreement.64 Along with the prior existence of IPRs protec-
tion, a country's technological and economic development plays a 
substantial role in determining the impact of the TRIPS Agreement. 55 
In large part this is due to the costs of innovation that are much 
higher for low income developing countries and LDCs than they are 
for middle income countries, which are likely to experience greater 
benefit from higher IPRs protection as well.66 
Generally, developing countries received far fewer preferences 
than LDCs in the TRIPS Agreement.67 For example, in order to pro-
vide developing countries and LDCs with time to implement massive 
reforms, the TRIPS Agreement established a staggered system of ac-
cession whereby developing countries had until January 1, 2000, and 
LDCs have until January 1, 2006, to comply fully with the TRIPS 
Agreement's standards. 58 "Moreover, if under the TRIPS Agreement a 
developing country is required to extend product patent protection 
to areas of technology not yet so protectable in its territory, an addi-
tional transitional period of five years will apply to such areas of tech-
nology."69 
In the TRIPS Agreement, however, a separate regime for phar-
maceutical and agricultural chemical products was established.70 Pro-
visions for these items in particular state that patent applications for 
new inventions in these two areas may be filed during the transition 
period for developing countries and LDCs.71 Once the period has ex-
pired, patent protection shall be extended for the remaining patent 
period measured from the filing date.72 "For many pharmaceuticals 
and agrochemicals this in fact means the same thing as if there were 
no transitional period, because the development and testing of such 
products also easily takes ten years. "73 
Additional measures to support both developing countries and 
LDCs include Article 67 of the TRIPS Agreement, which requires in-
dustrialized countries to assist developing countries and LDCs in their 
64 Id. at 295; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at arts. 65(2), 66-67. 
65 DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 1, at 104. 
66 !d. 
67 Bmnckers, supra note 24, at 1257. 
68 See Cheek, supra note 19, at 295; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at ans. 65(2)& 66. 
69 Bmnckers, supra note 24, at 1258; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 65(4). 
70 Bmnckers, supra note 24, at 1253; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at an. 70(8). 
71 Bmnckers, supra note 24, at 1253. 
72 !d. 
73 Id.; see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 70(8). 
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efforts to reform their domestic IPRs regimes. 74 This includes "assis-
tance in the preparation of laws and regulations on the protection 
and enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as on the pre-
vention oftheir abuse .... "75 
Specifically for LDCs, Article 66(2) of the TRIPS Agreement 
compels developed country members to provide incentives to enter-
prises and institutions, for the promotion and encouragement of 
technology transfer to LDCs, so that they may be able to create a 
"sound and viable technological base. "76 Despite these mechanisms to 
support developing countries and LDCs and the principles and objec-
tives of the TRIPS Agreement, it remains unclear whether the TRIPS 
Agreement truly fosters the acquisition of technology for advance-
ment by developing countries.77 
III. DEVELOPING CoUNTRIES AND THE wro FoURTH 
MINISTERIAL CoNFERENCE 
Leading up to the WfO Fourth Ministerial Conference at Doha, 
Qatar in November 2001, developing countries and international civil 
society organizations began calling actively for a trade round that 
would focus on the needs of, and issues faced by, developing coun-
tries.7B Key issues that had emerged around the TRIPS Agreement in-
cluded technology transfer provisions, compulsory licensing, and ex-
tensions for transition periods.79 In light of the failed attempts to 
commence a negotiation round at Seattle in 2000, developed coun-
tries felt particular pressure to ensure that these talks did not break 
down.80 
During the special session of the TRIPS Council in September 
2001, a group of develo·ping countries submitted a proposal to the 
74 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 67. 
75 Id. at art. 67. 
76 Id. at art. 66(2). 
77 See Carlos Correa, Review of the TRIPS Agreement: Fostering the Transfer of Technology to 
Developing Countries, at http:/ /www.twnside.org.sg/title/foster.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 
2002). 
78 See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 4, at 2-3; PES Group, supra note 4, at 2; Developing 
Country Group's Paper, TRIPS Councii,IP/C/W/296 (June 20, 2001) [hereinafter Devel-
oping Country Paper]. 
79 See generaUy PES Group, supra note 4, at 11-12; Fowler, supra note 4, at 36-42; Devel-
oping Country Paper, supra note 78. 
80 See The Economist Global Agenda, Getting Close (Nov. 13, 2001), at http://www. 
economist.com/ agenda/ displayStory.cfm?Story _ID=862698. 
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Secretariat for circulation.81 This proposal sought to reaffirm certain 
crucial rights and responsibilities and to clarify others established un-
der the TRIPS Agreement at the conference in Doha.82 
Most notable in the proposal prepared by the group of develop-
ing countries was the focus on re-balancing rights and obligations in 
favor of the public interest.83 This included allowances for compulsory 
licensing without prior attempts to obtain authorization from the 
rights holder in cases of national emergency or extreme urgency.84 It 
also called for wro members to refrain from threatening or impos-
ing sanctions on developing countries and LDCs when they act within 
the TRIPS Agreement to promote and protect public health.85 
Another important factor included in the proposal on intellec-
tual property is contained in paragraph 13, which focuses on extend-
ing the transition period.86 Here, developing countries sought a five-
year extension to the transition period established in Article 65 ( 4) of 
the TRIPS Agreement, which relates to patent protection of products 
not protected at the time in which the TRIPS Agreement becomes 
applicable for a particular member.87 They also sought a five-year ex-
tension from the expiration of the transition period for LDCs estab-
lished by Article 66(1) of the TRIPS Agreement.88 Finally, and per-
haps most importantly, they focused on reaffirming the language of 
the objectives and principles outlined in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.89 
By the time the group of developing countries had put forth their 
proposal, the reaffirmation of the contents and spirit of Articles 7 and 
8 had become a key element in their negotiating stance.90 The failure 
of developed countries to engage in this technology transfer and to 
support the technological advancement of developing countries 
81 See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights General Council: 
Proposal by the Mrican Group, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philip-
pines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Venezuela, IP/C/W/312 (Oct. 4, 2001), available at 
http:/ I docsonline.wto.org/ gen_search.asp [hereinafter Developing Country Proposal]. 
82 Id. at pmbl. 
ll!!Jd. 
M Id. at para. 4. 
86 I d. at para. I 0. 
86 See Developing Country Proposal, supra note 81, at para. 13. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
88 Id. at pmbl. 
90 See Developing Country Paper, supra note 78, at paras. 4, 17-23. 
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spurred criticism.91 In particular, developing countries were con-
cerned that all provisions of the TRIPS Agreements should be read in 
light of these objectives and principles, thereby acknowledging that 
"the mere existence and the exercise of IPRs, such as patents, do not 
necessarily result in the fulfillment of the objectives of the [TRIPS] 
Agreement. "92 
The draft Ministerial Declaration that eventually became the 
framework for negotiations at Doha, however, was a far cry from the 
proposal put forth by developing countries.93 While recognizing the 
gravity of public health crises that many developing countries face, 
this draft did little more than acknowledge the provisions and the 
flexibility already outlined in the TRIPS Agreement.94 Markedly, the 
only substantial change from this draft to that of the actual Declara-
tion on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health adopted at Doha on 
November, 13, 2001, was the inclusion of tuberculosis and malaria to 
accompany HIV I AIDS as examples of public health crises for which 
members could invoke compulsory licenses.95 
Certainly the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the WfO made 
progress on critical issues surrounding the TRIPS Agreement. The 
Director-General, Mike Moore, went as far as to say that, "the meeting 
at Doha will be remembered as a turning-point in the history of the 
wro and the trading system and in relations between developed and 
developing countries within that system. "96 Despite important strides 
made in reaching consensus in a multilateral trade framework, the 
prospects for developing countries under the TRIPS Agreement after 
the Fourth Ministerial Conference remain unclear. 
While the Ministerial Declaration stated that the needs and in-
terests of developing countries resided in the heart of the Work Pro-
gramme it created, the language pertaining to the TRIPS Agreement 
remains restrictive.97 The only substantive issue addressed with regard 
to the TRIPS Agreement at this conference appears to be public 
91 Id.; Correa, supra note 77, at 11-12. 
92 See Developing Country Paper, supra note 78, at para. 19. 
93 See General Council, Draft Declaration on Intellectual Property and [Access to Medicines] 
[Public Health], at http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/doha/docs/IP27oct.pdf [hereinafter 
Draft Ministerial Declaration] (last visited Nov. 12, 2002). 
94 See id; see generally TRIPS Agreement. 
95 See Draft Ministerial Declaration, supra note 93; Public Health Declaration, supra note 11. 
96 Director-General Mike Moore, Address at the 14th general meeting of the Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Council (Nov. 28, 2001), at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/ 
spmm_e/spmm73_e.htm. 
97 See Ministerial Declaration, supra note 11, at paras. 17-19. 
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health concerns for which Members ratified a separate Declaration-
appropriately called the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health.98 The core of this second Declaration resides in para-
graph 5, which clarifies the flexibilities that already existed in the 
TRIPS Agreement that allow for compulsory licenses subject to re-
strictions and for parallel imports subject to domestic laws.99 In addi-
tion, paragraph 5 also reaffirms that according to the customary rules 
of interpretation of public international law, each provision in the 
TRIPS Agreement should be read in light of the Agreement's objec-
tives and principles.I00 Whether or not these objectives and principles 
are upheld by individual Members or the organization as a whole will 
become apparent in the days ahead. 
CoNCLUSION 
The proper role of IPRs in light of a globalizing economy re-
mains contested. "The difficulty stems from divergent concepts of 
property and ownership .... Different legal principles exist from 
country to country, stemming from the particular social, political and 
ideological experiences of each." 101 Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, 
IPRs protection ranged from totally open regimes that did not protect 
private IPRs to highly protectionist regimes in which both products 
and processes could be protected.1°2 While views both for and against 
extensive IPRs protection, as evidenced by the TRIPS Agreement, are 
strong, there is little concrete evidence that it is the only incentive for 
innovation or that it will lead to socio-economic and technological 
development.103 
Ultimately, the TRIPS Agreement is the type of global protection 
of IPRs that developed countries have been seeking. "However, the 
TRIPS Agreement simultaneously narrows the developing countries' 
·access to technology, discouraging the rapid diffusion of new tech-
nology needed for economic growth. "104 Some headway was made at 
Doha on addressing issues faced by developing countries and LDCs in 
relation to the TRIPS Agreement, but the balance between creating 
private incentives and fostering technology transfers and development 
98 Public Health Declaration, supra note 11. 
99 !d. at paras. 5b, 5d. 
100 !d. at para. 5a. 
101 Giuta & Shang, supra note 48, at 329-30. 
1o2 See Cheek, supra note 19, at 286. 
103 See Chang, supra note 54, at 294-95; Braga, supra note 5, at 36-4 7. 
104 Su, supra note 3, at 171. 
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for the public benefit has not yet been achieved. Mter Doha, it is clear 
that the TRIPS Agreement should not prevent developing countries 
from addressing public health needs. There is more work to be done, 
however, on the issue of technology acquisition and creation by de-
veloping countries, which remains largely unsupported by the TRIPS 
Agreement and the recent Ministerial Declarations. 
